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The Minister says that for India’s sake, people should leave their villages and move to 
the cities. He’s a Harvard man. He wants speed. And numbers. Five hundred million 
migrants he thinks, will make a good business model. 
Not everybody likes the idea of their cities filling up with the poor. A judge in Bombay 
called slum dwellers pickpockets of urban land. Another said, while ordering the 
bulldozing of unauthorized colonies, that people who couldn’t afford to live in cities 
shouldn’t live in them. 
Arundhati Roy (2014: 1) 
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Summary 
The world is in the midst of a long and uneven urban transition, with the great majority of 
urbanisation and urban population growth now occurring in parts of Asia and Africa. 
Urbanisation has profound effects on local rural and urban economies, life chances and 
environments, though much depends on how it is handled. The stereotypical view is that 
cities and urbanisation are economically advantageous but socially and environmentally 
deleterious. This Evidence Report follows other recent research in contradicting this 
oversimplified view. It explores how urbanisation and cities can contribute to the three global 
goals identified by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) as priorities for the post-2015 
period: (1) reducing economic inequalities; (2) creating more secure and inclusive societies; 
and (3) accelerating the transition to sustainability. 
Each of the goals is shown to pose different challenges for cities and urbanisation, though in 
each case the relationship is somewhat paradoxical. Rapid urbanisation is often blamed for 
rising inequalities, but these inequalities are accentuated by efforts to inhibit the urbanisation 
of some of the more disadvantaged population groups, even as the ‘urbanisation’ of private 
investment is being encouraged. Cities and rapid urbanisation are also often blamed for 
urban insecurity and violence, but here too the rhetoric is stronger than the evidence, and 
there are more obvious culprits, including urban exclusion. Cities and urbanisation are also 
usually treated as undermining global sustainability. This is partly because the economic and 
technical efficiencies of cities and urban towns have historically been used to support much 
higher levels of production and consumption, when in principle they could instead have 
contributed to achieving the same or even somewhat higher consumption levels with lower 
levels of resource use and wastage. Generally, cities and rapid urbanisation have been part 
of the process that has helped bring the challenges of inequality, insecurity and 
unsustainability to the fore; now, they must also play a key part in addressing these 
challenges. 
Without more inclusive urbanisation and cities, the goals are likely to become intractable. 
More inclusive urbanisation requires, among other things, planning for – and perhaps more 
importantly planning by and with – the growing low-income urban populations in urbanising 
countries. This requires a major shift in approach and one that cities will be hesitant to follow 
without more support from national governments and others. There are a number of other 
areas where conventional approaches must change if cities and urbanisation are to 
contribute effectively to the three global goals, but where the alternatives remain poorly 
developed or understood. Decentralisation policies have not always succeeded in making 
local governments more accountable to urban citizens, let alone aspiring migrants; a more 
strategic decentralisation is needed if cities are to achieve social as well as environmental 
goals. It is also important that local governments engage more constructively with informality; 
current approaches are problematic and can accentuate the conflicts between social and 
sustainability goals. Finally, the report argues that improving human wellbeing needs to 
become a more central and measured goal if cities are to facilitate the pursuit of economic, 
social and environmental goals in a unified way. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Urbanisation and its discontents 
Much praise has been lavished on cities in recent years, countered by growing fears that 
ongoing urbanisation (see definition in Box 1.1) in Asia and especially Africa is too rapid to 
handle (McGranahan, Schensul and Singh 2016). References to exponential urbanisation 
and exploding cities abound. There is some uncertainty in the underlying estimates; those 
most commonly used are produced by the United Nations Population Division (Buettner 
2014; McGranahan 2015; United Nations 2014), but much also depends on how the 
estimates are presented. 
Figure 1.1 presents the urbanisation challenge of the first half of the twenty-first century as a 
daunting one. Almost all of the world’s projected population growth is in the urban areas of 
developing regions, where the urban population is projected to increase from less than 2 
billion in 2000 to more than 5 billion in 2050; by then, the urban population of these regions 
will account for well over half of the world population (rural and urban). Most of the increase 
is in developing Asia and Africa, with urban populations in Asia (excluding Japan) projected 
to increase from 1.3 billion to 3.2 billion, and urban populations in Africa from 0.3 billion to 1.3 
billion. How this population increase is accommodated is clearly going to make an enormous 
difference to whether and how development goals are achieved. More generally, this 
segment of the world population – demographically as well as economically insignificant in 
1950 – is going to comprise well over half of the world population by 2050. Economically, 
politically, socially and environmentally, this will involve an enormous shift. 
Figure 1.1 World population by rural/urban and more developed regions 
(MDR)/less developed regions (LDR) (billions) 
 
Source: Based on data from United Nations (2014). 
Figure 1.2 is based on the same set of statistics, but presents them in somewhat less 
daunting terms. According to these estimates, the number of additional people added 
annually to the world’s population has recently peaked at about 77 million, and is projected to 
decline to about 62 million by 2050. Only in Africa are the annual increments increasing: from 
about 10 million at the start of the twenty-first century to more than 30 million by 2050. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Rural MDR Rural LDR Urban MDR Urban LDR
4 
Figure 1.2 Estimated annual increment in world urban population by 
region (millions) 
 
Source: Based on data from United Nations (2014). 
Figure 1.3 presents the annual percentage rates of urban population growth (left) and 
urbanisation (right) for the major world regions. It shows a general decline over the whole 
period from the middle of the twentieth century to the middle of the twenty-first century. The 
rates of urban growth are consistently higher than the rates of urbanisation – the difference 
being (to a first approximation) the region’s rate of overall population growth. 
Figure 1.3 Urban population growth rates (left) and urbanisation rates 
(right) by region (% per year for five-year periods) 
 
Source: Based on data from United Nations (2014). 
Overall, these rates suggest that while the world is still in the midst of the global urban 
transition, it is beginning to wind down, and words like ‘exploding’ and ‘unprecedented’ are 
misplaced. Nevertheless, there are indications of growing concerns about excessive urban 
population shares in urbanising countries. In 2013, 84 per cent of governments in Asia and 
85 per cent in Africa had policies to lower rural–urban migration, up from 75 per cent in Asia 
and 46 per cent in Africa in 1976 (United Nations 2013: 122; United Nations 2014). 
0
   10
   20
   30
   40
   50
   60
   70
   80
   90
Africa Asia Latin America Other
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
9
5
0
-1
9
5
5
1
9
5
5
-1
9
6
0
1
9
6
0
-1
9
6
5
1
9
6
5
-1
9
7
0
1
9
7
0
-1
9
7
5
1
9
7
5
-1
9
8
0
1
9
8
0
-1
9
8
5
1
9
8
5
-1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
-1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
-2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
-2
0
0
5
2
0
0
5
-2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
5
2
0
1
5
-2
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
-2
0
2
5
2
0
2
5
-2
0
3
0
2
0
3
0
-2
0
3
5
2
0
3
5
-2
0
4
0
2
0
4
0
-2
0
4
5
2
0
4
5
-2
0
5
0
Africa Asia
Latin America World
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
9
5
0
-1
9
5
5
1
9
5
5
-1
9
6
0
1
9
6
0
-1
9
6
5
1
9
6
5
-1
9
7
0
1
9
7
0
-1
9
7
5
1
9
7
5
-1
9
8
0
1
9
8
0
-1
9
8
5
1
9
8
5
-1
9
9
0
1
9
9
0
-1
9
9
5
1
9
9
5
-2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
-2
0
0
5
2
0
0
5
-2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
5
2
0
1
5
-2
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
-2
0
2
5
2
0
2
5
-2
0
3
0
2
0
3
0
-2
0
3
5
2
0
3
5
-2
0
4
0
2
0
4
0
-2
0
4
5
2
0
4
5
-2
0
5
0
Africa Asia
Latin America World
5 
Box 1.1 Defining urbanisation 
Demographers define ‘urbanisation’ as the increasing share of a population that is urban; this report 
uses the same definition. Thus, the level of urbanisation is the share of a population that lives in 
urban areas and the rate of urbanisation is the annual percentage growth in this share. Statistics on 
urbanisation are complicated by three factors: (1) different countries defining urban differently; (2) 
most urban and rural population estimates being based on past (and sometimes long past) census 
data; and (3) the sharp distinction implied between rural and urban becoming increasingly blurred – 
with, for example, suburbanisation and the emergence of urban regions. 
‘Urbanisation’ is often used more broadly, and taken to include the economic, social and 
environmental shifts associated with the transition from rural to urban. This can be a problem as the 
associates of demographic urbanisation change over time and between countries. Also, it should 
not be assumed that urbanisation is driving associated economic, social and environmental shifts. 
Urbanisation is also sometimes used to refer to the increasing share of the land or economy (for 
example) that is urban. It is important to distinguish these definitions from demographic 
urbanisation. For example, demographic urbanisation is associated with a shift from lower to higher 
density settlements, while the urbanisation of land can be associated with a shift from higher to 
lower density settlements. 
Source: McGranahan (2015). 
 
Urbanisation is rarely the straightforward result of rural dwellers (cultivators) leaving the land 
and going to the city to find jobs in industry or other urban occupations. It is, by and large, the 
net result of many comings and goings between and within rural and urban areas. In many 
countries with large rural populations there is seasonal, circular, otherwise temporary 
migration into or through urban areas. Migration alters the gender and age composition of 
urban populations, and while these changes vary over time, during periods of rapid net 
migration urban populations tend to receive a higher share of people of child-bearing and 
working age. Well-managed, this ought to provide a demographic dividend to the city, 
particularly as urban populations tend to have fewer children. 
There is also an economic logic to urbanisation, though it is not just economic prospects that 
can attract people to cities. Urbanisation often accompanies a country’s shift out of 
agriculture, and results in part because most non-agricultural enterprises are more 
productive in urban locations where they can take advantage of returns to agglomeration. 
However, rural economies are also often shifting out of agriculture and diversifying, including 
into industrial production, while many low-income urban dwellers have informal service jobs. 
In the course of urbanisation, many families strategically try to spread their risks and 
opportunities, spanning the rural–urban divide, and creating what have been called ‘multi-
local’ or ‘stretched’ households. Adverse rural conditions, including natural disasters and 
collective violence, can drive urbanisation (though the poorest rural dwellers may not have 
the economic capacity to migrate). This can be more difficult – for the migrants and for the 
cities they go to – than when economic opportunities are attracting them. 
The rapid increase in urban population can be difficult for urban authorities to cope with. 
Coupled with the widespread tendency for people to blame outsiders and ‘others’, it is 
perhaps not surprising that when there is rapid urbanisation and urban growth and conditions 
in cities are problematic, rural migrants often attract a disproportionate share of the blame. 
Already stretched public resources become scarcer, public facilities become more 
congested, and migrants can be scapegoated for multiple urban deficiencies. When mobility 
is high, it can be difficult to identify migrants, because with people migrating out as well as in, 
the number of migrants will be more than statistics related to net migration might seem to 
imply. But low-income residents living in insecure and informal housing are typically seen as 
having more rural characteristics, less urban, and a source of problems. 
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On the other hand, urbanisation is often viewed as inherently beneficial to a country’s 
economy. As neatly captured in the quote from Arundhati Roy which introduced this report, 
although rural–urban migration is often blamed for urban woes, it is also often part of a 
country’s ‘business model’. One of the recurring themes of this report is that if the goals of 
reducing inequality, achieving more secure and just societies, and accelerating the transition 
to sustainability are to be achieved, a more inclusive approach to urbanisation is sorely 
needed. 
1.2 Structure of the report 
Section 2 examines the relationships between cities, urbanisation and economic growth and 
their interpretation. It starts with a quick look at the industrial cities of the nineteenth century, 
which became symbols of urbanisation, modernisation and economic growth – as well as 
poverty and pollution. It then looks at more contemporary interpretations of cities and 
urbanisation as drivers of modernisation and economic transformation. The new urban 
economics – with its focus on the economic logic of city formation, and on how and to what 
extent urban agglomeration yields economic benefits – has contributed to a more positive 
attitude to urbanisation as a motor of economic growth (Spence, Annez and Buckley 2009; 
World Bank 2009). This contrasts with the sociology of cities as growth machines, with its 
longstanding focus on the negative politics of urban growth coalitions (Harding and Blokland 
2014: 93–107; Logan and Molotch 2007). The agenda of these coalitions, claiming to be in 
the best position to secure the economic growth of their cities, is not necessarily supportive 
of the agenda for urban growth suggested by the new urban economics, let alone the key 
development goals around which the rest of the report is structured. This section argues that 
while it is important to seize the economic advantages that the new urban economics 
identifies, it is equally important not to reify economic growth, and instead to assess both 
formal and informal urban economies in the broader context of human wellbeing. 
 
Box 1.2 Defining inclusion 
Unless otherwise specified, we use ‘inclusion’ to refer to an improvement in the terms on which 
people take part in society, through: 
1. Removing discriminatory exclusions, such as denying migrants the right to settle in the city 
(space), buy property (markets), send their children to school or access health care 
(services); 
2. Ensuring that prevailing institutions (regulating markets, the provisioning of services and the 
use of space) incorporate the voices and reflect the needs of disadvantaged groups, 
thereby addressing structural exclusions; 
3. Ensuring that the human rights of otherwise disadvantaged groups are fully met through, 
among other means, markets, public services/provisioning and access to spaces. 
This definition builds on that used by the World Bank (2013) in emphasising inclusion in spaces, 
markets and services, but follows McGranahan et al. (2016) in identifying three levels of inclusion. 
All three levels represent improvements for those being included. In cities as elsewhere, there are 
important situations where measures presenting themselves as inclusive have adverse effects on 
those purportedly being included. This is sometimes referred to as ‘adverse inclusion’, but under 
this definition would be more consistently termed ‘false inclusion’. 
Spatial exclusion and inclusion are particularly critical in urban areas. There are important 
processes excluding some people from the city; others are excluded to the periphery of cities and 
still others are effectively excluded within the city. In urban settings, the third level of inclusion has 
parallels with the notion of the ‘right to the city’, which has been debated heavily in recent years 
(Bhan 2009; Brown 2013; Harvey 2008, 2012; Parnell and Pieterse 2010). 
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Section 3 turns to issues of cities, urbanisation and inequality. In recent decades, economic 
inequality in many parts of the world, most notably the wealthiest parts, has been increasing 
(Justino and Moore 2015; Piketty 2014). Urbanisation and cities are often viewed as 
contributing to inequality, and though the links are disputed, it is in the political economy of 
urbanisation that many of the policies affecting inequality play out. Urban bias – the idea that 
most people living in poverty are in rural areas while people in cities have disproportionate 
power, secure a disproportionate share of public resources, and devote them to cities – was 
first articulated in the 1970s (Lipton 1977) and remains influential (Jones and Corbridge 
2010). Unfortunately, a concern with urban bias is often used to justify targeting policies and 
investments to reduce poverty and inequality in rural rather than urban areas. This is 
unfortunate because exclusive urbanisation can also be a source of considerable inequality. 
Cities often compete to attract investment, but would prefer to prevent rural–urban migration 
exceeding levels that can be accommodated with formal jobs and formal housing. 
As described in this section, the politics of exclusive cities can be active and overt in their 
attempts to control in-migration and urbanisation (as in the racist apartheid system of South 
Africa or the bureaucratic hukou system of China); or they can be passive and informal (as 
with policies that helped create the favelas (slums) of Brazil and informal settlements more 
generally). In all of these cases, however, exclusionary urbanisation has left a legacy of 
spatially configured inequality that is extremely difficult to overcome. Inclusive urbanisation is 
key to addressing inequality, but needs to be made consistent with the economic and political 
ambitions of cities. 
Section 4 focuses on cities, urbanisation, violence and security. As a recent IDS Evidence 
Report by Luckham (2015) argues, there is a contradiction at the heart of the security–
development nexus, and nowhere is this more evident than in cities: 
On the one hand, security is a process of political ordering. Even more than 
development, it intermeshes with established power structures, property relations and 
inequalities. On the other hand, it is founded upon the claim that states and other 
forms of public order make citizens safe from violence and insecurity. In principle, it is 
equally shared and socially inclusive, even if in practice it is anything but. 
(Luckham 2015: 5). 
Cities are increasingly the sites of violence, and urban violence is often blamed on rapid 
urban growth and related disorder. However, it was recognised as far back as the 1970s that 
‘The linking of crime, violence, and disorder to urban growth must fall into the category of 
things people simply want to believe, for the belief rests on no substantial foundation of 
verified fact or systematic analysis’ (Lodhi and Tilly 1973: 296). Indeed, not only is the 
statistical relationship between urban population growth and violence weak, but where such 
a relationship exists, it quite possibly reflects attempts to stem this rapid urban growth 
through exclusionary practices, rather than being a direct outcome of growth. The quick 
review undertaken for this section suggests that while there are numerous forms of urban 
violence and numerous approaches to achieving urban order, inclusive urbanisation provides 
at least part of the basis on which to address urban violence equitably. 
Section 5 considers the role of cities and urbanisation in achieving the transformation to 
sustainability. This has become a global priority largely due to the city-led development 
initially epitomised by the industrial urbanisation characteristic of both Europe in the 
nineteenth century and China at the turn of the twentieth century. While urbanisation and 
cities may have been central to creating the global sustainability challenge, they will also 
need to be central to the transformation of human activities and institutions so that they are 
no longer testing the boundaries of what the planet can take without risking catastrophic 
environmental change. As a recent IDS Evidence Report, Accelerating Sustainability: Why 
Political Economy Matters, states: ‘We know what the problems are and where we need to 
get to. But we know much less about how to get there’ (Schmitz and Scoones 2015: 7). 
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Section 5 starts with a quick review of the urban environmental transitions that helped to 
create the sustainability challenge, and the underlying political economy of that challenge. It 
then goes on to consider the role of cities and urbanisation in forging a route to global 
sustainability. It recognises that an inherent part of the environmental sustainability challenge 
is that for local coalitions such as those that can form at the city scale, there is a serious free-
rider problem: however much any individual city contributes to the global sustainability 
transition, it makes no significant difference to its global environmental outlook, or at least not 
directly. This has not stopped cities from acting on issues like climate change; but for such 
city-based action to be sustained there will need to be alliances of coordinated actions, from 
neighbourhoods up through cities and nations to regional and global scales, and back down 
again. It is not clear whether new technologies and information technology (IT) in particular 
will support or undermine such alliances; the literature supporting smart cities makes it clear 
that there will be greater capacity to achieve such coordination, but is less clear on how the 
increased capacity will be deployed. 
The report ends with a brief look at how the pursuit of these different goals can be brought 
together. If the goals are pursued separately, conflicts and large trade-offs are likely to arise, 
especially regarding economic aims. It is argued that the combined pursuit of these goals will 
be facilitated by more inclusive urbanisation, strategic decentralisation, engaging 
constructively with urban informality, and treating the economy as a means to improving 
human wellbeing rather than an end in itself. 
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2 A critical look at cities, urbanisation and 
economic growth 
Cities and urbanisation have long been associated with economic advantage but also with a 
sacrifice in equality, security and environmental quality. Britain’s nineteenth century 
manufacturing cities were at the centre of the industrial revolution – places where urban 
capitalists with larger and more production facilities could hire the increasing supply of urban 
labourers for subsistence wages, tap nearby natural resources, trade with local firms, reach 
distant markets, and drive the market economy forward. These cities were also centres of 
extremes of poverty, pollution and unruly behaviour, and many had death rates higher than 
their birth rates (Garenne 2010). Contemporary affluent cities are more staid and healthy. A 
well-known urban economist recently described cities (with more hubris than irony) as ‘our 
greatest invention, making us ‘richer, smarter, greener, healthier and happier’ (Glaeser 
2011). Urbanisation remains a contested process, however, and just as in the industrialising 
and urbanising countries of the nineteenth century (Williamson 1990), many governments in 
rapidly urbanising countries today are concerned that their cities’ populations are growing too 
fast (United Nations 2013). Moreover, even the world’s most successful cities have a dark 
side (Sassen 2014). 
2.1 Is urbanisation good for the economy? 
The role of markets, regulations and collective action in translating urbanisation into 
economic growth is still not well understood. Until the 1990s, when the new urban economics 
adapted the tools of conventional economics to the study of urbanisation, mainstream 
economics was largely a-spatial (Krugman 2011). The new urban economics identifies a 
variety of factors that explain the economic advantages of urban agglomeration (Duranton 
2009; and various chapters in Henderson and Thisse 2004) and the higher productivity of 
larger urban settlements (Behrens, Duranton and Robert-Nicoud 2014). The agglomeration 
economies can be roughly divided into the following categories: matching (e.g. being better 
able to find the workers and products that best match the needs of the enterprise); sharing 
(e.g. being able to benefit from sharing larger-scale and hence lower-cost infrastructure and 
services, such as piped water systems and hospitals); and learning (e.g. being able to find 
out from other similar firms what innovations are working and worth adopting) (Duranton and 
Puga 2004). Such agglomeration economies are not just related to settlement size, but would 
be expected to contribute to higher productivity in larger settlements. Indeed, it was 
estimated on the basis of the empirical work available a decade ago that a doubling in 
settlement population is associated with a 3–8 per cent increase in productivity (Rosenthal 
and Strange 2004: 2,133). 
More recent evidence on this relationship suggests that the mechanisms are far more 
complex than those initially modelled (as illustrated in several papers in Duranton, 
Henderson and Strange 2015). The evidence on the relationship between urbanisation and 
productivity is weakest in Africa and Asia, where issues of urbanisation are most pressing 
(Turok and McGranahan 2013). Regardless, as economies move out of agriculture, 
urbanisation clearly offers potential economic benefits they can take advantage of. Whether 
technological progress will accentuate or reduce this urban advantage is unclear: it was once 
assumed that the IT revolution would conquer distance and render cities obsolete, but 
instead it has rejuvenated cities, especially in areas of finance, which are particularly 
dependent on IT. 
The nature of the agglomeration economies is such that the shift from rural to urban, and 
from small to larger settlements, provides economic opportunities. But these opportunities 
must be secured. They do not apply to most agricultural tasks, which require labour to be 
applied over large areas. Nor do they apply to just any concentration of people and activities 
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in urban areas. The agglomeration economies of matching depend on the cities having the 
right mixes of workers and enterprises, with different mixes in different cities. The economies 
of sharing depend on the large-scale urban infrastructures and services being provided. The 
economies of learning still depend to a surprising degree on face-to-face communication and 
what has sometimes been called the ‘buzz’ of the city (Storper and Venables 2004). 
Neoliberal economists may be inclined to assume that these economies will spontaneously 
emerge through private property and markets. However, cities are shot through with features 
that can render urban markets dysfunctional (Duranton 2009). When the enterprises and 
people come together in close proximity in cities, their activities do not just provide the basis 
for beneficial matching, but also for public bads such as unsanitary conditions and pollution, 
which unless actively addressed can render urban concentration far more hazardous to 
health than dispersed rural living. The shared urban infrastructure and services that benefit 
from being large in scale are also at risk of monopolisation – which has historically been one 
of the reasons for their being public. Finally, face-to-face communication and learning in the 
city depends on a culture of productive communication and shared learning, as well as 
spaces in which this communication and learning can take place. 
The lesson for cities wanting to achieve economic growth would seem to be that it is critical 
to create the sort of city where enterprises can flourish, with the right workers and 
intermediate goods easily accessible, appropriate infrastructure available to share, and other 
enterprises and people to learn from. The most tried solutions seem to lie in a well-governed 
system of public and private property rights and good urban planning, including the creation 
of spaces for self-organising as well as more formal face-to-face communications. Transport 
and communications arteries and infrastructure are critical to the overall functioning of any 
city, and underpin all of the agglomeration economies. How rural–urban land conversions are 
handled and how land is allocated among different public and private uses and users will 
clearly be critical to achieving the economies associated with good matching. How land is 
serviced, how infrastructure costs are recovered, and how rights of access are distributed will 
be critical to the sharing economies. These conditions are all easier to describe than achieve; 
but the better they are achieved, the less likely they are to gain public and media attention. 
The World Bank used the new urban economics to make the case for urbanisation as a 
desirable spatial transformation, and the case was laid out in detail in its World Development 
Report 2009 subtitled ‘Reshaping Economic Geography’ (World Bank 2009). The central 
message of the report was that governments need to think in ‘3-D’, and recognise that 
increasing ‘density’ (i.e. urbanisation), shorter ‘distances’ and reduced ‘divisions’ enable 
more integrated and successful economies (World Bank 2009). The authors argued that a 
positive approach to urbanisation – far from being less important in sub-Saharan Africa – 
was particularly important there (World Bank 2009: 285). Their emphasis was exclusively on 
using urbanisation to assist the economy, ignoring that the approach a country or city takes 
to urbanisation can also have profound social and environmental effects. Indeed, the report 
explicitly excluded ‘the social and environmental effects of a changing economic geography’ 
from its analysis (Box 0.1 on page 34 was entitled ‘What this report is not about’). 
Given how the new urban economics interprets the economics of urbanisation, it is not 
surprising that its social and environmental dimensions were ignored. Economic integration, 
greater returns to scale and economic matching, sharing and learning all pose no obvious 
social or environmental threats, except those inherent in economic growth itself. But the 
approach the World Bank describes is largely devoid of politics, while the implementation of 
policies designed to turn cities into motors of growth is always highly politicised. As David 
Harvey (2009: 1272) interprets the self-imposed limitation of the report: ‘The authors felt no 
obligation to consider how increasing social inequality and poverty along with environmental 
degradation might actively be produced through capitalism’s market-led uneven geographical 
development’. In practice, attempts to tap the economic benefits of urbanisation are not 
neutral efforts to enhance productivity, but political processes, potentially involving 
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exploitation and environmental destruction. Urban economic growth strategies are highly 
political, and involve conflicts between investors and ordinary citizens as well as among 
investors. 
2.2 Are urban growth coalitions good for the economy? 
There is an important stream of urban sociology, going back to the 1980s, that explores the 
urban coalitions and the politics of cities as ‘growth machines’ (Logan and Molotch 2007). In 
this analysis, the emphasis is not on whether and how urbanisation can benefit the economy; 
it is on the machinations of city coalitions that form, often presenting themselves as the 
doyens of economic growth, but more concerned with the sorts of urban development that 
will serve their own economic interests than those that serve the rest of the city (except in so 
much as the latter will serve their political interests). Logan and Molotch focused on North 
American cities at a time of increasing awareness that much urban ‘renewal’ was actively 
harming low-income groups, while benefiting those involved in orchestrating local 
development. They argued that to understand city dynamics and uncover the prevailing 
regime one had to ‘get physical’ (Logan and Molotch 2007: vii), and study how land, real 
estate and development projects were being controlled, who was benefiting and who was 
losing out. They located a central conflict between those for whom the city was a growth 
machine, who were interested in land and buildings primarily as a basis for increasing 
exchange value, and those for whom the city was a place to live, who were more interested 
in its use values. 
Though research and debate about the politics of cities as growth machines has waned, in 
many ways such politics are at least as relevant to rapidly urbanising countries today as they 
were to North American cities of the 1980s, even if the form that the politics take is often 
somewhat different (Shatkin 2007, 2014). In a context of globalisation, less regulated 
markets, and a weakening in the economic role of national governments, the economics and 
politics of cities have become increasingly prominent. Structural adjustment directly 
challenged the economic role of national governments in many low- and middle-income 
countries (Stiglitz 2002). In more than 75 countries, decentralisation programmes have 
shifted some state responsibilities to lower tiers of government (Ahmad et al. 2005). 
Combined with the shift towards more democratic governance, decentralisation has helped 
to enhance the role of urban authorities in many Latin American countries (Campbell 2003; 
Satterthwaite and Mitlin 2014: 97). Some have argued that the success of cities 
demonstrates that they deserve more power (Barber 2013). Alternatively, more critical 
researchers have focused attention on the dark underside of the rising cities (e.g. Sassen 
2014), including the megacities of the global South (e.g. Koonings and Kruijt 2009). It has 
been pointed out that many decentralisation efforts have been partial, leaving government 
‘closer’ to the citizens but no more accountable to them (Devarajan, Khemani and Shah 
2009), and that decentralisation can leave urban governance more prone to elite capture 
(Bardhan 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005). 
In the 2000s, the conventional wisdom in high-income countries grew more favourable of 
cities and saw city competitiveness as a ‘fundamental source of prosperity in an increasingly 
market-driven economy’ (Turok 2005: 25). In modern service economies, and especially their 
high-tech segments, it has been argued that it is jobs that follow people, and that the key to 
an economically successful city is to attract the ‘creative class’ (Florida 2003, 2005). Against 
this, Storper (2013: 225), for example, derides such efforts on the grounds that they ‘crowd 
out discussions of the most basic challenge for city-regions, which is how to generate 
income’, and argues that for cities, ‘winning in the development process depends on 
successful specialization and respecialization’. Both of these approaches are in danger of 
encouraging destructive growth machine politics and environmentally destructive 
competition. Efforts to privilege the ‘creative class’ are in danger of subsidising gentrification 
(Krätke 2012), and the exclusion of the lower-income fractions of the implied ‘non-creative 
class’. Efforts to attract the right investments are in danger of becoming a means of 
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subsidising investors favoured by a growth coalition more interested in their own wealth than 
the wellbeing of the city region (which is unlikely to have a politically powerful constituency). 
The view that economic competition between cities is a good basis for pursuing economic 
growth, let alone human wellbeing, is debatable. As Paul Krugman has pointed out, the 
productivity-enhancing mechanisms inherent in market competition among firms do not apply 
directly to economic competition among cities or countries (Krugman 1994, 1996). When a 
special issue of Urban Studies in 1999 tried to address the issue of whether inter-city 
competition was a good thing, the authors were generally favourable, but they used an 
expanded definition of city competitiveness that departed considerably from narrow 
economic competition: 
… the degree to which cities can produce goods and services which meet the test of 
wider regional, national and international markets, while simultaneously increasing 
real incomes, improving the quality of life for citizens and promoting development in a 
manner which is sustainable. 
(Lever and Turok 1999: 792) 
In effect, they defined away the problem. They accepted that economic competition is 
necessary, but then added the proviso, rather than the prediction, that the competition also 
yield social and environmental benefits (see also Buck et al. 2005). 
The pressure to prioritise economic growth is greater in the cities of low- and middle-income 
countries, where there is also less capacity to prevent growth coalitions from manipulating 
the outcomes to their own benefit (McGranahan et al. 2016). City-based public–private 
partnerships and large developer-led projects have displaced city planning in many locations 
(Shatkin 2007) and provide a vehicle for temporary urban growth coalitions to organise 
around. Studies of Manila, Mumbai and Delhi have shown in some detail how the strategies 
of such growth coalitions diverge from those typically described in the literature on growth 
machines in the United States, although they too engage in steering the benefits of economic 
growth their own way as well as rent-seeking and corrupting local government (Heller 2014; 
Shatkin 2008). Foreign private and state interests can also intrude, particularly where cities 
are linked to special economic zones designed to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). 
 
Box 2.1 Defining informal 
‘Informal’ is often used loosely to refer to settlements or segments of the economy that are not 
formally accepted by government, either because they are not recognised (e.g. registered) or 
because they do not conform to official regulations (e.g. labour laws or building standards). For this 
report, the central concern is settlements and economic activities that do not conform to official 
regulations, at least in part because those living in the informal settlements or working in the 
informal economy are living in poverty and cannot afford to meet the regulations at their own cost 
without facing even greater deprivation. 
More statistically tractable definitions focus on the shelter deprivation of the households in informal 
settlements (as with UN-Habitat statistics on slum households) or the lack of legal or social 
protection of the employment arrangements of those working in the informal economy (as with 
statistics from the International Labour Organization (ILO) on employment in the informal economy 
(International Labour Office 2013)). This statistical facility is, unfortunately, bought at the cost of 
making the complex political challenges of informality misleadingly straightforward, with 
formalisation as the obvious solution. 
It must be recognised, however, that by limiting the discussion of informality to the informal 
settlements and economies of the poor, this report evades any discussion of the large and growing 
informality of affluence, with its very different dynamics and consequences. More generally, the very 
terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ can seem to imply a dichotomy, where in practice there are clearly 
different levels and types of formality and informality. 
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In Asia, the relationship between national gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and 
levels of urbanisation has been tighter than in other world regions (McGranahan et al. 2014). 
As the case of China indicates particularly clearly, the existence of corruption-prone alliances 
spanning public and private sectors does not prevent cities from becoming effective motors 
of economic growth. On the other hand, China’s experience also illustrates how this 
prioritisation of economic growth can lead to unnecessarily sharp increases in inequality and 
environmental distress (McGranahan et al. 2014). Indeed, the tendency to prioritise 
economic growth first, and worry about social (and environmental) issues once the capacity 
of the economy is stronger, has created a heavy legacy in other emerging economies 
(McGranahan, Turok and Martine 2014). This is not just because of the politics of cities as 
growth machines, but also because of a more general tendency not to recognise or support 
activities and enterprises that are making a substantial contribution to human wellbeing 
despite relatively low economic productivity. Many such activities are found in the informal 
economy or in informal settlements, both of which are often viewed as obstacles to rather 
than vehicles for economic success. 
2.3 The informal economy, urbanisation and human wellbeing 
While cities and urbanisation have been receiving considerable support from the new urban 
economics, government officials in rapidly urbanising countries tend to be concerned that 
their cities’ populations are growing too rapidly, harming rather than contributing to the urban 
economy. Although urban growth rates and urbanisation rates in Asia and Africa have 
reportedly been steady or falling in recent decades (McGranahan 2015), concerns about 
excessive concentrations of populations in urban areas have been increasing (McGranahan 
et al. 2016; United Nations 2013). 
Alongside these concerns, there is the persistent claim that, in sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular, countries are experiencing urbanisation without industrialisation or economic 
growth (Fay and Opal 2000; Jedwab and Vollrath 2015). This claim has been challenged on 
economic grounds (Spence et al. 2009) and for relying on misleading urbanisation statistics 
(Potts 2009, 2012). However, it is clearly true that a large share of the population growth in 
urbanising countries is being housed in informal settlements (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013), 
and the working age population is heavily dependent on the informal sector (International 
Labour Office 2013). This expanding informality goes against conventional visions of 
modernisation, and can reinforce officials’ fears that cities are growing too rapidly. However, 
for many urban dwellers, informality is preferable to the prevailing rural situation where they 
might also be dependent on an informal economy, but a less productive one. 
An emphasis on economic growth, defined as increasing income per capita, is in danger of 
belittling the contribution of the informal economy and reinforcing an urban growth politics 
that seeks to urbanise the formal economy without urbanising the population, which is unable 
to secure formal employment or afford formal housing. The formal economy is generally 
more productive than the informal economy (Porta and Shleifer 2014). Formal housing is 
generally of higher value than informal housing. But this does not imply that wellbeing would 
be improved if the urban informal economy and settlements were suppressed. Some parts of 
the informal economy and the informal settlement system create more harm than good, but 
large parts make critical contributions to the wellbeing of some of the most disadvantaged 
urban dwellers, including migrants. 
It has long been recognised that income poverty is only one dimension of urban poverty, and 
the contribution of the informal sector is more than the market value of its production might 
seem to imply (Wratten 1995). The rapidly growing research on subjective wellbeing 
demonstrates that while individual and household income do influence wellbeing, other 
factors, including social relations, are also important (Diener, Tay and Oishi 2013; Easterlin, 
Angelescu and Zweig 2011; White and Blackmore 2016), and the informal economy often 
helps people to build social networks and capital. At least as important, the informal sector 
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often provides critical goods, services and employment opportunities that are not formally 
available. Moreover, while for many urban officials informality provides a basis for 
harassment and the extraction of informal payments, there are some that use the lack of 
formality as an opportunity for more constructive relations. 
From an economic perspective, while the non-agricultural informal economy is also growing 
in rural areas, one would expect that, like formal activities, informal activities would also 
benefit from the economies of agglomeration – through matching, sharing and learning. 
Better matching is provided by urban locations, particularly as many informal activities 
provide services that cannot be provided at a distance (such as paid and unpaid care work in 
the home). Better sharing is also provided by urban locations, at least to the extent that 
informal workers and residents have access to and can afford the large-scale urban 
infrastructure. And while the benefits of urban learning in informal enterprises and 
settlements are not well quantified, one of the best-known recent attempts to theorise the 
economics of rural–urban migration emphasises learning (Lucas 2004).1 
Despite the well-documented importance of the informal sector (Vanek et al. 2014), the role 
of the informal economy in improving human wellbeing remains relatively under-researched. 
A recent study of the wellbeing of workers living in informal settlements in Bangladesh and 
India applied a mix of techniques to explore determinants of wellbeing and their institutional 
basis (Gupte and te Lintelo 2015).2 Despite considerable variation in wellbeing in the sample, 
there was little difference in wellbeing associated with having work in the informal sector 
versus casualised work in the formal sector. Those involved only in unpaid care work had 
particularly low wellbeing scores in several domains, and while gender had little influence on 
wellbeing priorities, scores were lower among women. The results confirm the expectation 
that the wellbeing conferred by both the informal economy and informal settlements depends 
heavily on the specific conditions of the work or settlement, and that the lack of support given 
to many informal activities and settlements places a particularly heavy burden on women. 
  
                                               
1 Lucas (2004) emphasises learning the skills required by modern production technologies, but one would also expect informal 
learning to be important to success in the informal economy. 
2 Purposively selected focus groups were used to identify community views on the most important components of and 
contributors to local wellbeing. These were organised under a globally recognised classification of ten domains of wellbeing. A 
survey instrument, including questions on local conditions as well as the respondents’ levels of satisfaction, was designed to 
obtain indicators for the key components of wellbeing that had been identified. The survey instrument was administered to male 
and female workers living in informal settlements at a selection of sites in Bangladesh and India. 
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3 Cities, urbanisation and inequality 
The relationship between cities, urbanisation and inequality is complex and contingent. On 
the one hand, urbanisation is part of the economic transformation that is generally associated 
with increasing national inequalities, as some benefit more from economic growth while 
others get left behind. On the other hand, efforts to suppress urbanisation by making it more 
difficult for people to move from rural to urban areas are likely to amplify these inequalities. 
Moreover, as alluded to in Section 2, the fact that there are inevitable inequalities associated 
with market-led economic growth, and that this growth relies on rewarding the pursuit of 
wealth, can become an excuse for approaches to urban development that create more 
inequality than is good for economic growth, let alone for human wellbeing. The complexity of 
urban politics and economics makes it difficult to distinguish clearly between attempts to 
improve the economy and attempts to divert income to those driving the growth agenda. 
A stylised fact commonly accepted among economists in the second half of the twentieth 
century was that in a market economy, inequality first increased with a country’s economic 
growth and then declined. Urbanisation was very much part of the original explanation for 
this ‘Kuznets curve’. According to Kuznets’ classic analysis, with higher urban incomes, 
urbanisation would initially lead to more overall inequality, but this inequality would fall as the 
urban sector became predominant (Kuznets 1955: 13). Combined with equally systematic 
shifts that would reduce intra-urban income inequalities, Kuznets suggested that the 
declining inequality being observed in the United States, England and Germany in the first 
half of the twentieth century was a pattern that other developing market economies would 
follow. An assessment of inter-country relationships seemed to verify this (Kuznets 1963). 
However, inequality did not continue to decline in affluent countries. Indeed, looking only at 
the shifts in the income shares of the highest decile in the United States since the 1920s, one 
could reach the opposite conclusion: that inequality first decreases with economic growth 
and then increases (Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2011: 6). Clearly, such curves should be 
interpreted with caution. 
Importantly, the effect of urbanisation on inequality cannot be reduced to one of rural people 
becoming like urban people, as the analysis of Kuznets and his followers could be mistaken 
to imply. Urbanisation sets off profound political and economic dynamics, and does not leave 
intra-urban, intra-rural and rural–urban inequalities unchanged. When Kanbur and Zhuang 
(2013) follow a Kuznets-like approach and decompose the source of changing inequalities in 
a set of Asian countries into these components, plus a share explained by urbanisation, they 
find that in most cases urbanisation is contributing to inequality. This is an interesting 
exercise, based on mathematical identities, but should not be taken to imply that if measures 
were taken to curb urbanisation the result would be less inequality (or that support for 
urbanisation has led to increasing inequality in Asia). 
Robinson and Acemoglu (2002) provide a different and more overtly political and context-
specific account of how and why the inequalities created by early industrialisation and 
urbanisation were reversed in some countries: 
The process of industrialization increased economic inequality and may also have 
mobilized the poor segments of the society by concentrating them in urban centers 
and factories. These developments led to increased political unrest, or even to the 
threat of revolution. We argue that in response to the political unrest and the threat of 
revolution, the political elites were forced to undertake radical reform. 
(Robinson and Acemoglu 2002: 184) 
They also argue that these same political dynamics have not been uniformly reproduced with 
industrialisation and urbanisation in other parts of the world. Accompanying the rise of 
democracy and increased decentralisation in Latin America – which for most countries 
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occurred after the urban transition was largely complete – there have been some notable 
urban successes. These have in turn helped to address the extremes of national inequality 
experienced in many Latin American countries. More broadly, urban informal workers have 
become better organised, and there has been international organising – for example, through 
Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) (http://wiego.org/). 
Overall, however, the trend of income inequality in low- and middle-income countries has not 
exhibited any strong direction in recent decades (Justino and Moore 2015). 
In any case, the political struggles that urbanisation can set off do not all focus on production 
politics. In Castells’ 1977 book, The Urban Question, he argued that the locus of urban 
politics was shifting from struggles over working conditions in factories to struggles over the 
conditions of collective consumption in the city. He followed this up with a review of grass-
roots urban movements, and their attempts to gain more control over the city-building 
process (Castells 1983). The struggle to improve access to land and living conditions in cities 
remains an important one. There have been important developments, with federations of the 
urban poor, often rooted in women’s savings groups, becoming influential in many cities. 
Through Slum Dwellers International (SDI), many have also networked nationally and 
internationally and brought the concerns of urban poor groups more directly into international 
policy processes (Satterthwaite and Mitlin 2014). Such initiatives have not, however, been 
able to compensate when heavily political or economic pressures have been brought to bear, 
fostering exclusion and exacerbating shelter poverty. 
3.1 The legacies of exclusive urbanisation in the BRICS 
While it is not possible to directly assess the impacts of urbanisation on overall inequality, it 
is possible to identify forms and examples of urban exclusion that are linked to urbanisation 
in mixed economies and are exacerbating inequalities. A recent review of urbanisation in the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) (McGranahan et al. 2016; 
McGranahan et al. 2014b) noted that urban exclusion tends to be particularly severe when 
amplified by fears that too many people who are not contributing to the urban economy are 
moving in from rural areas. In South Africa, the apartheid system was an explicitly racist 
attempt to resist urbanisation, and left a legacy of segregation and fragmentation. China’s 
hukou system is a more bureaucratic system employed to control urbanisation, and though 
neither racist nor as exclusionary as apartheid, it is also set to leave a damaging legacy. 
Brazil’s attempt to resist urbanisation was more passive, but led to the emergence of favelas, 
creating one of the country’s major social fault lines. Issues of urban exclusion are 
increasingly central in India, which is urbanising at a slower rate. (Russia, like South Africa 
and China, had a pass system, but exclusion from cities was never very critical during its 
planned urbanisation.) 
As a recent review noted ‘Twenty years after apartheid was formally abolished it continues to 
shape South African society’ (Mariotti and Fourie 2014: 113). Even before apartheid, 
successive white governments had long struggled with the tension between the economic 
demand for urban labour and the political demand to prevent large numbers of black Africans 
from becoming urban citizens. The apartheid system was an authoritarian response, which 
deployed the state machinery to enforce a legally based spatial exclusion, with mostly work-
related exceptions. South Africa’s inequalities, and its fractured and segregated cities, still 
bear the imprint of this apartheid exclusion (Turok 2014). 
China’s hukou system has been so central to the country’s embracing of urbanisation, as a 
core plank in their economic strategy, that it is somewhat misleading to present it as a means 
of resisting urbanisation. However, the hukou system was based on a system that at the start 
of the liberalisation period tightly controlled people’s spatial mobility, especially across the 
rural–urban divide, which was also a divide in social provisioning systems. The system was 
adapted incrementally and experimentally so that people were given much greater spatial 
mobility but less social mobility. The cities were protected from having to take responsibility 
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for rural–urban migrants working in the factories or service industries. The migrants gained 
few of the social benefits accorded to official residents. Some cities have experimented with 
various adjustments to the system, and there is no longer such a strict rural–urban divide 
built into the system. The hukou system and the social divisions it created remains a major 
challenge for China (McGranahan et al. 2014b). 
The favelas of Brazil have become emblematic of the informal settlements that represent one 
of the most pervasive and variegated outcomes of exclusionary urbanisation. Brazil was 
more passive in its resistance to urbanisation, and to the migration of poor rural dwellers into 
the major cities in particular (Martine and McGranahan 2013, 2014). In effect, its urban elites 
and authorities were unable to slow the net migration to the cities appreciably, but they were 
more successful at excluding disadvantaged migrants and other urban poor groups from the 
formal city; these groups settled in poorly controlled spaces where neither private ownership 
nor public planning held sway. While there are a number of different low-income housing 
forms in Brazilian cities, the favelas of Rio and other major cities are probably the best-
known informal settlements in the world. Janice Perlman (1976) wrote a well-known book, 
The Myth of Marginality, which argued that favela dwellers, while excluded from many urban 
benefits, were tightly integrated into the economy and full of capabilities, capacities and 
hope. Three decades later, she found that social and spatial exclusion (or what could be 
termed ‘adverse inclusion’) had prevailed even where evictions had been avoided (Perlman 
2010). Despite the shift to democracy and better living conditions in the favelas, the residents 
were in many ways less hopeful and more oppressed, not only by the authorities but by 
gangs involved with guns and drugs, enforcing their own brand of security (McCann 2014). 
The tight control of urbanisation through registration and regulation – as with apartheid South 
Africa and the Chinese hukou system – is extremely costly, onerous and relatively rare. Even 
the direct costs of running such systems are very high; Wang (2004) estimates that at one 
point, the hukou system employed hundreds of thousands of field officers and tens of 
thousands of computers. Despite their unique histories and particular challenges, it is the 
favelas of Brazil , the Chinese ‘urban villages’ (Wu, Zhang and Webster 2013), the ‘slums’ of 
India and the post-apartheid informal settlements of South Africa that are more typical of the 
land-based exclusion found in so many low- and middle-income countries. 
3.2 Informality and urban exclusion 
Many countries and cities adopt building standards and land-use and other regulations that if 
fully enforced would raise the quality of urban built-up areas, reduce the density, improve 
working conditions and decrease inequalities within the city – largely by forcing those who 
could not afford to live in the higher-quality city to leave. In practice, people who are unable 
to secure a formal job or to afford a formal home in a city seek work in the informal economy 
and a home in an informal settlement. Strict regulations can be very difficult and costly to 
enforce, particularly during periods of economic, agricultural or conflict-related crisis, or once 
informal settlements and enterprises have become the norm. 
People who are struggling to secure a place in the city seek out places where rents and 
property prices are low or vacant land that can be occupied at a cost they can afford – and 
which nevertheless allows them to secure some sort of livelihood. In some cases residents of 
informal settlements may have been involved in squatter-led processes or even land 
invasions, but this is the exception. More powerful actors such as land developers, 
employers or politicians are often involved in the development of informal settlements, and 
profit from them financially or politically. Many inhabitants of informal settlements are renters. 
There may be structure owners with valid, disputed, or no land titles. The buildings may or 
may not conform to land-use and building standards. But almost by definition there is 
something about informal settlements that puts the residents at a legal disadvantage, and 
excludes them from some of the benefits of being an urban citizen. They may be refused 
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environmental services, not be provided with transport infrastructure, or be excluded from 
schooling or health care. 
People who are struggling to gain a livelihood face similar problems when they cannot find 
formal employment. They either do informal work for formal enterprises, or work in the 
informal economy, typically in a small enterprise or self-employment, earning low incomes. 
Like the residents of informal settlements, they face numerous disadvantages because of 
their informal employment status. Women who work for pay are especially likely to work in 
the informal economy, and tend to be concentrated in those segments of the informal 
economy that are less remunerative and often involve working in or around the home. This 
partly reflects women’s unpaid care work responsibilities, which make it harder for them to 
secure formal employment or employment in the higher-paid segments of the informal 
economy. It can, however, reflect other forms of gender-based discrimination. 
Whether informal work and informal settlements are seen to increase or decrease inequality 
depends on what is envisaged as the alternative. If the alternative is the strict enforcement of 
existing regulations and policies that a large segment of the population cannot afford to abide 
by, and do not have a collective interest in, then informality can be seen as increasing 
inequality. If the alternative is the development and implementation of regulations and 
policies that do serve those currently living and working in informality, then informality can be 
seen as an obstacle to increasing inequality. It also depends on whether the existing 
informality provides space and support for self-organisation and collective action, or whether 
it merely opens the door for official harassment and discrimination. 
In effect, informality can be an awkward compromise that involves what is defined as 
exclusion in this report, but which could also be described as adverse inclusion. From a 
spatial and economic perspective, those living or working in informality are included in the 
city, but the terms of that inclusion are adverse in part because they are not fully included 
politically. 
3.3 Cities and urbanisation that contribute to reducing 
inequality 
It is probably too optimistic to expect rapid urbanisation to contribute to reducing inequalities, 
at least in the short term. Such urbanisation typically takes place during periods of 
dislocation, when changes in the economy, patterns of conflict or the environment are giving 
a greater advantage to urban locations. Inequality is quite likely to be rising during such 
periods. As evident from the previous discussion, however, taking measures to make it more 
difficult for people to move to and settle in urban locations is exclusionary and likely to 
increase inequalities. This is especially likely when policies explicitly or implicitly target those 
who are unable to afford formal housing and to secure formal employment in urban areas. It 
is likely whether the rapid urbanisation is being driven by rural push (such as rural conflicts or 
environmental degradation), urban pull, or some combination of the two. 
A more inclusive urbanisation, reducing inequality, would open up more urban land in plots 
suitable for affordable housing, in a manner that allows self-build options to compete with 
private and public options. It would involve planning more actively and progressively for 
urban expansion (Angel 2015), and also for densification (Hasan, Sadiq and Ahmed 2010). It 
would involve removing exclusion from urban spaces, markets and services based on 
identities, but also based on structural barriers, such as those linked to informality. 
Urban social security could also be designed to reduce inequalities, and to allow for rural-
urban mobility and urban inclusion. As documented by Gentilini (2015), the social security 
programmes extended to rural populations have not been adequately developed for urban 
areas. There is a danger that requiring cities and towns to finance measures to improve the 
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social security of their low-income populations would increase their incentive to exclude 
these same populations. Mobile national social security programmes could both reduce 
inequalities directly, and reduce urban incentives to exclude migrants and expel their low-
income populations. 
More inclusive urbanisation is sometimes taken to be a threat to the economy, but there are 
a wide range of actions that can be taken to support more inclusive urbanisation without 
undermining economic performance. Indeed, some measures of inclusion are likely to be 
economically beneficial, for the economy as a whole if not for the urban economy alone. 
These include proactive planning for urban expansion and densification, both of which 
increase urban efficiency. 
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4 Cities, urbanisation and security 
4.1 The relationship between urbanisation and violence 
In ‘Rapid Urbanization and the Growing Threat of Violence and Conflict: A 21st Century 
Crisis’, Patel and Burkle (2012: 194) present a longstanding but misleading narrative on 
urbanisation and violence in their Special Report in a health and medical journal: 
As the global population is concentrated into complex environments, rapid 
urbanization increases the threat of conflict and insecurity. Many fast-growing cities 
create conditions of significant disparities in standards of living, which set up a natural 
environment for conflict over resources. As urban slums become a haven for criminal 
elements, youth gangs, and the arms trade, they also create insecurity for much of 
the population. Specific populations, such as women, migrants, and refugees, bear 
the brunt of this lack of security, with significant impacts on their livelihoods, health, 
and access to basic services. This lack of security and violence also has great costs 
to the general population, both economic and social. 
This narrative was constructed to attract attention to the heavy toll that urban violence incurs 
in a great many urbanising countries, and to spur the international humanitarian community 
to act on the inequalities and planning failures, which they claim are caused by rapid 
urbanisation and contribute to the violence. In presenting excessively rapid urbanisation as 
the underlying driver, however, they not only base the narrative on a dubious claim but on 
one that subverts their own proposed solutions. Indeed, they are in danger of implicitly 
providing support for the sort of exclusionary urbanisation criticised in the previous section. If 
rapid urbanisation is the problem, then why encourage it through proactively planning for 
urban population growth? 
Violence is urbanising along with people, but this should not be taken to imply that 
urbanisation is associated with increasing violence, and still less that it causes violence. The 
international homicide statistics presented in a World Bank report display some weak 
patterns consistent with the claim that urbanisation contributes to violence (Marc and 
Willman 2011). In 32 out of 50 countries, the homicide rate in a principal city was higher than 
the national average (ibid.: 16). Faster-growing cities were also found to have higher 
homicide rates than slower-growing cities, though the relationship was not very significant 
statistically (p=0.06). 
More detailed analyses have not borne out the claim that rapid urban city growth or 
urbanisation is an important driver of violence. Buhaug and Urdal (2013) employ a database 
on events involving social disorder in 55 major cities in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa to 
explore whether city population growth contributes to social disorder. None of the models 
they tested supported this association. Instead, they found that ‘urban disorder is primarily 
associated with a lack of consistent political institutions, economic shocks, and ongoing civil 
conflict’ (Buhaug and Urdal 2013: 1). Using a subset of 34 of these cities for which the 
relevant data were available, Østby (2015: 1) tried to explore whether rural–urban migration 
contributes to social disorder, and concluded that: 
It is not the actual movement of rural people into the cities that creates social 
upheaval. Rather, overall poor and unequal educational opportunities as well as 
socioeconomic marginalization of rural–urban migrants are found to spur increased 
levels of urban violence. 
In any case, even if city population growth or the presence of rural–urban migrants was 
statistically associated with social disorder or homicides, measures to keep migrants from 
settling in the city could make matters worse. Indeed, a statistical relationship between 
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urbanisation and violence could reflect conflict resulting from attempts to stop the migration. 
In yet another complication, the conflict resulting from urbanisation could, in some 
circumstances, help to drive reforms that enhance long-term security, as implied by 
Robinson and Acemoglu’s (2002) account of how the struggles of urban workers drove 
political change in urbanising Europe. Alternatively, it could stimulate a response more in line 
with the new military urbanism (Graham 2010), which if successful would confirm Dennis 
Rodgers’ provocation that ‘a safe and secure city is arguably a dying city’ (Rodgers 2015). 
In a different vein, some cities do not so much breed violence as have violence thrust upon 
them. The drug trade has contributed to the rise or transmutation of urban violence, including 
in recent decades in many countries of Latin America (Bourgois 2015). Larger-scale armed 
conflicts often involve fighting for control of strategically located cities, placing their 
populations at risk. Arms and armed conflict can also infiltrate cities in countries bordering 
those involved in armed conflicts. Thus it is perhaps not surprising that Karachi – the port in 
Pakistan through which arms flow to Afghanistan and drugs flow back – is one of the most 
violent cities in the world despite not directly being involved in a war. But even in Karachi, the 
levels and types of violence are complex and contingent on many other factors, including 
how the city has been urbanising and how local and external factors combine (Gayer 2014). 
Irregular warfare is itself becoming increasingly urban, and this has fostered the militarisation 
of selected cities and an increasing focus of international as well as local counter-insurgency 
on urban conflicts and control (Graham 2010; Kilcullen 2013). Kilcullen, an Australian 
counter-insurgency expert, adopts much of the misleading narrative about rapid urban 
population growth being a leading driver of urban conflict and insecurity. He nevertheless 
provides powerful insights into the dynamics of irregular warfare and conflict in extreme 
situations, and the role of both local exclusion and foreign connections and interventions. In a 
section on ‘Future Cities, Future Threats’, he examines the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in 
2008, the shifting conflicts in Kingston’s ‘garrison’ communities leading up to a violent US-
backed destruction of a settlement heavily involved in the international drug trade, and the 
rise of violence leading up to and beyond the 1993 battle of Mogadishu that led to the US 
pull-out. In each case, informality and the problematic relations between certain deprived 
settlements and local authorities helped to foster the violence; international connections were 
also critical, with international terrorist networks or drug smugglers as well as foreign states 
involved, at least indirectly. Despite his clear association with Western counter-insurgency, 
Kilcullen sees approaches that seek to impose order from the outside as counterproductive. 
He argues for approaches that build capacities and co-design responses not just with local 
authorities but with local communities (Kilcullen 2013). 
Violence is heavily gendered and age-related. Young men are especially likely to be involved 
in gang violence, homicides and violent social disruptions, and are also the most common 
victims. Women also suffer from urban gang violence (Baird 2015; Hume and Wilding 2015), 
urban political violence (Khan 2010: 104–16) and warfare (though see Wood 2009 for an 
examination of the relative absence of sexual violence among some armed groups). 
Especially for women and children, less visible and less deadly forms of violence can also be 
a major concern, and may play out differently in urban areas. This includes a large share of 
sexual and gender-based violence. For example, while it is difficult to discern whether 
violence against women is greater or less in urban areas, the statistics in Table 4.1 indicate 
that, at least in the countries selected, violence against women by their intimate partner is 
considerably higher in rural areas, while violence against women by non-partners is 
considerably higher in urban areas. 
There is also a spatial patterning of violence in cities. Stereotypically, domestic violence 
centres on homes, gang violence on (poorer) streets, ethnic conflict on neighbourhoods, 
theft-related violence on transport hubs, social disorder on squares, terrorism on crowded or 
strategic locations, and irregular warfare on whole cities. While the spatial patterns of 
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violence are far more complex than such stereotypes imply, different sorts of violence do 
display different patterns. Between and within cities, there is also what could be termed a 
‘place’ dependence of violence, as it tends to occur in the same homes, streets, 
neighbourhoods, hubs, squares and strategic locations. The spatial pattern in any particular 
city depends on its particular conditions and histories. Thus Karachi’s homicides have been 
concentrated for some years in a set of peripheral neighbourhoods sometimes referred to as 
its ring of fire (Gayer 2014). On the other hand, ethnic differences and conflicts are discussed 
and negotiated in a wide range of spaces. Indeed, as Ring (2006) demonstrates, important 
efforts to produce peace are being undertaken in the zenana or women’s space of middle-
class apartment buildings, which might superficially seem to be isolated from the arenas of 
conflict. 
Table 4.1 Proportion of adult women experiencing physical and/or sexual 
violence by intimate partner or non-partner by rural/urban residence for 
Brazil, Peru, Tanzania and Thailand 
 Adult women having experienced physical or sexual violence… 
By intimate partner (%) By someone other than intimate partner (%) 
Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Brazil 37 29 23 40 
Peru 69 51 18 31 
Tanzania 56 41 19 34 
Thailand 47 41 14 20 
Source: McIlwaine (2013: Table 1). 
More generally, behind the patterning of urban violence lie complex issues of territoriality, 
barriers, segregation, and a host of other locational factors (Pullan and Baillie 2013). To 
continue with the example of Karachi, attempts to steer violence and divide or protect 
populations range from erecting barriers around middle-income communities and strategic 
locations to the simpler barriers put up in low-income communities – these last being prone 
to being dismantled by public security forces (Ahmed et al. 2015: 33). 
Urban exclusion and informality can create places of violence, though the majority of informal 
settlements are reasonably peaceful places. In some ways the lack of policing in informal 
settlements is analogous to the lack of other services such as health, water and waste, with 
similar consequences; in the absence of safe policing, local inhabitants are put at risk, and in 
some circumstances the risks can spill over into better-off neighbourhoods. Violence is more 
likely to occur when there are bad relations between local authorities and the residents of 
deprived and excluded communities. Even in the United States, where more than 10 per cent 
of young African American men are already in prison, police patrolling low-income African 
American neighbourhoods reinforce exclusion by harassing, chasing and trying to book still 
more in order to meet targets, creating a sub-population ‘on the run’ (Goffman 2014). 
In effect, the authorities and the police often protect some groups more than others, and for 
excluded populations in particular, state forces can become sources of violence and 
insecurity. In many informal urban settlements around the world, the police are less present 
than in formal areas. This is not always perceived to be a disadvantage. However, it can 
leave openings for criminal or violent political organisations to infiltrate or even emerge from 
the informal settlements. In the short term, illicit organisations may gain local support by 
providing valuable services and functions that the absent state does not, even as they earn 
their money or gain their political power from illegal activities. In the longer term, as informal 
settlements grow increasingly difficult to police (rather than just being unpoliced), they can 
become a safe haven for groups trying to avoid the authorities – groups that might once have 
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sought refuge in rural forests or uplands, as with James Scott’s (2009) upland anarchists of 
Southeast Asia. Whether from the authorities or those battling them, this often brings more 
insecurity and conflict to local residents. Some of this insecurity and conflict can come from 
state reprisals against illegal or illicit organisations operating in informal settlements, though 
in some cases there are alliances between certain state forces and these organisations. 
More generally, research in Latin America illustrates that lethal urban violence is related to a 
range of political processes, linked to but not reducible to inequality and exclusion. Thus 
party politics and how they play out within cities and between national and urban 
governments have an influence on urban violence (Hoelscher 2015), as do relations between 
urban authorities and business interests (Moncada 2013, 2016). 
4.2 Cities and urbanisation that contribute to a more secure and 
inclusive society 
Urban exclusion can lead to violence, and for some scholars extreme forms of social 
exclusion are themselves forms of violence. As Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004: 1) 
note in the introduction to their edited volume on Violence in War and Peace: ‘Violence is a 
slippery concept – nonlinear, productive, destructive, and reproductive’, while ‘Structural 
violence – the violence of poverty, hunger, social exclusion and humiliation – inevitably 
translates into intimate and domestic violence’. From this perspective, if the state imposes 
security without addressing these forms of structural violence, one would have to ask 
‘Security for whom?’ More directly relevant to the goal being examined in this section, it is 
doubtful that being secure in one’s poverty, hunger, social exclusion and humiliation is being 
secure at all, but it is certainly not the basis for a secure and inclusive society. 
Even at its simplest, the relationship between urbanisation and building a secure and 
inclusive society is somewhat paradoxical. Urbanisation poses serious challenges for 
security and inclusion, but resisting urbanisation poses a bigger challenge. To a first 
approximation, it is through more inclusive urbanisation that a more secure and inclusive 
society needs to be built. As with the goal of reducing inequality, this means ensuring that 
cities are more welcoming of rural migrants and do not let the challenge of urban economic 
growth become an excuse for excluding segments of the urban population, thereby creating 
conditions of exclusion, insecurity and violence. More generally, as Gupte (2016) argues, 
approaches to peace-building and political settlements in cities need to understand how the 
physical forms of the city (grid) and the institutions through which people are included or 
excluded (governance) are contributing to violence, but also to recognise that the shifting 
dynamics and identities of violence (ephemerality) cannot be reduced to the effects of 
material and institutional conditions. 
Given the complex, contradictory and ephemeral qualities of urban insecurity and violence, 
human wellbeing is not likely to be well served by a narrow understanding of security that 
equates it with something imposed by security forces, or that sees violence through the eyes 
of the state. It is, in other words, important to address the challenge of ‘rethinking violence in 
the vernacular’ (Luckham 2015: 20–26). Even in a very simple sense, one person’s security 
can be another’s exclusion, oppression or even victimisation. But the very terms in which 
violence and security are understood and debated vary enormously, with very practical 
implications for who will benefit in what way from which actions and policies. 
A recent review found positive but quite mixed results from a range of innovative approaches 
to community-based urban violence prevention (Mathéy and Matuk 2015). Given the scale of 
the challenge and of the innovative solutions being promoted, this is not surprising. The very 
nature of violence makes it difficult to address effectively through small-scale interventions 
alone, even if such measures must be part of the solution. In the right circumstances, small 
innovations involving more inclusive or community-based measures can be expected to 
24 
contribute to enhanced security and inclusion, but not in the face of widespread violence and 
social upheaval, and not on their own. Medellín’s celebrated efforts to combat violence and 
insecurity involved measures to enhance the inclusion of informal settlements, partly by 
providing better transport links. Even at the micro level, neighbourhoods with these links 
experienced greater reductions in violence than those without (Cerdá et al. 2012). But as 
Moncada (2016) argues, Medellín’s success with an inclusive and participatory programme 
to reduce violence was preceded by a participatory programme that failed. According to 
Moncada, the difference was that in the second case, ‘collaborative relations between an 
inclusionary mayor and the cohesive business community coupled with the emergence of an 
armed territorial monopoly sustained the participatory project’ (Moncada 2016: 56). 
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5 Cities, urbanisation and sustainability 
5.1 The relationship between urbanisation, economic growth 
and sustainability 
The sustainability of cities and their societies has long been a concern. It was a concern of 
Ibn Khaldūn (1967) when he wrote his introduction to world history in fourteenth century 
Tunis. He is best known for his theory of how city-based societies lose their ‘asabiyyah’ 
(collective vigour) under the corrupting influence of luxury, sedentary lifestyles and 
unwarranted inequalities, eventually leading to their downfall at the hands of rural tribes with 
a stronger asabiyyah. The cycle may be repeated, though not necessarily in the same 
location. In a section on the ‘requirements for the planning of towns’ (ibid.: 267–9), he also 
has cities falling ‘into ruins’ for environmental reasons. For this he blames founders of cities 
who saw only what was directly important to the pursuit of their short-term interests (such as 
trade and warfare, which rely on camels and the pastures, trees and brackish water that 
support them) and ignored the longer-term requirements for the sustenance of the city 
populations (sweet water sources for drinking, trees for firewood, fields for crops, pastures 
for domestic animals). In effect, as in modern cities, authorities prioritising a narrow set of 
short-term elite interests were apparently undermining the sustainability of their cities. 
The industrialising cities of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had more profound 
impacts on their regional hinterlands. Cronon (1991) charts part of this spatial extension in 
his environmental history of Chicago, illustrating the central role of its economy in the radical 
changes in the flora, fauna and by implication the ecosystems of the Greater Midwest in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, he shows how and why Chicago’s 
economy and its technologies reduced genetic diversity in the grasses, emptied forests of 
white pine, and led to an enormous growth in pig populations and their concentration and 
slaughter in the city. 
In today’s more affluent cities, long-term sustainability no longer depends just or even 
primarily on the relationship between the city and its regional environmental hinterland. As 
nodes in the global economic system, cities can now import resources, intermediate goods 
and consumables from far greater distances. They can also displace their wastes, pollution, 
and ecologically damaging activities, including through trade. The concept of an ecological 
footprint originated in the early 1990s as an attempt to demonstrate (using numbers) how 
much more influence cities have on the global environment than suggested by the 2–3 per 
cent of the world’s land area they occupy (Rees 1992; Wackernagel et al. 2006): a city’s 
ecological footprint is an estimate of the net land area needed to sustain the activities 
undertaken there. However, this sort of accounting is no substitute for understanding the 
underlying economic, political and ecological dynamics, although it can be useful 
heuristically. 
Looking back on our less environmentally disruptive rural past, environmentalists have 
tended to idealise a more environmentally benign rural future, where we are again living in 
close proximity and harmony with nature. This is changing. Where ecologists once treated 
cities as the other of nature, there is now a longstanding tradition of studying ecosystems in 
cities, and a somewhat more recent tradition of studying cities as ecosystems or parts 
thereof (Douglas 2011; Pickett et al. 2011). One of the insights that comes with seeing cities 
as an integral part of larger socio-ecological systems is that understanding cities requires 
understanding their connections with the rest of the world. On the other hand, it can be 
misleading to ascribe environmental burdens to cities and urbanisation simply because the 
damaging activities are concentrated in cities. As observed in the ‘Urban Systems’ chapter of 
the Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, ‘Urban demographic and economic growth has 
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been increasing pressures on ecosystems globally, but affluent rural and suburban living 
often places even more pressure on ecosystems’ (McGranahan et al. 2005: 795). 
Partly because the world is so economically unequal, there is enormous variation in the sort 
of environmental burdens incurred by different cities and neighbourhoods. To a first 
approximation, there would seem to be what amounts to an urban environmental transition 
related to economic status (ibid.). The environmental burdens created by activities in the 
poorest cities (and especially their poorest settlements) tend to stay close to home and 
threaten people’s health directly: unsanitary toilets or no toilets at all, smoky kitchens, 
polluted wells, pest infestation, and so on. The burdens created by the most affluent cities 
and neighbourhoods are increasingly global, undermining the world’s life-support systems; 
ecological footprints and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions required to support per capita 
consumption tends to be higher in more affluent cities and neighbourhoods. The heavily 
researched environmental Kuznets curve – which posits that environmental conditions first 
deteriorate and then improve as a country or city’s per capita income increases – has not 
been found to be generalisable (Stern 2004), though it does apply to a subset of 
intermediately scaled urban environmental burdens such as poor urban ambient air quality 
due to urban emissions. 
In practice, all cities are involved in creating and facing a complex mix of environmental 
burdens, with the influence of economic status complicated by local geography, governance, 
economic specialisation, technology development, demographic change and much more 
besides. Especially in the peri-urban areas of expanding cities, the overlapping burdens often 
come together in particularly acute ways. The general trend is for more affluent urban 
populations to use more resources and create more waste, but to use some of their wealth to 
protect themselves from the consequences of environmental degradation, drawing resources 
from and dispersing their wastes over longer distances. With the increasingly global 
environmental consequences of development, resilience to environmental shocks has 
become an important concern not only in more affluent cities but also in low-income 
settlements, which are often more vulnerable. 
Looking at the countries that were urbanising and industrialising in the nineteenth century, a 
stylised account of their environmental transition is as follows: their most pressing urban 
environmental problems in the nineteenth century were connected to unsafe household 
sanitation and work environments; their most pressing problems in the twentieth century 
were linked to ambient pollution problems brought on by industrialisation and motorisation; 
and their contribution to the twenty-first century’s environmental problems is linked to 
consumption-driven environmental burdens undermining global sustainability, with global 
climate change as the archetypal example. 
An optimistic interpretation of the environmental trajectories of these more affluent cities is 
that their past approaches to urban sanitation and pollution challenges need to be spread 
more widely and extended to the global sustainability challenges. The urban-based public 
health movement and sanitary revolution, and the increased capacities brought on by 
technological development and economic growth, helped these cities to address the 
sanitation-related challenge of the nineteenth century. The environmental movement of the 
twentieth century and the accompanying policy shifts (again supported by technological and 
economic developments) have enabled them to address most of the ambient pollution 
problems that were prevalent. From this optimistic perspective, we just need to launch a 
sustainability revolution – like the sanitation and pollution revolutions of the past, but bigger 
and better. 
A pessimistic interpretation of these same trajectories is that even in the most affluent cities, 
the environmental challenges have not been addressed so much as displaced, and that there 
is no viable way of displacing global environmental challenges. Moreover, the inequalities 
which ensure that other, less affluent cities are still suffering from severe sanitation or 
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pollution problems are part of a complex global challenge against which city-scale successes 
with sanitation or national-scale successes with pollution are largely irrelevant. 
The truth almost certainly combines elements of both of these interpretations. Attempts to 
achieve a twentieth century sustainability transition do need to learn from the urban-based 
sanitation and pollution revolutions, but simply mounting a larger version of these will not 
meet the global sustainability challenge. Part of the difference lies in the role of cities, and 
the rising importance of global governance to the sustainability challenge. 
5.2 Cities and urbanisation that accelerate the transition to 
sustainability 
In a very simple sense, it is a combination of economic globalisation and the spatial shifts in 
environmental burdens to the global scale that have made global governance the critical 
sustainability issue for the coming decades. While recent decades have seen significant 
international measures freeing up trade in commodities and capital (not labour), there has 
been no comparable progress in addressing inequalities or environmental burdens, or in 
strengthening the kinds of institutions that enable such goals to be pursued. As such, there is 
little reason to expect global income inequalities to decline appreciably (Galbraith 2012; 
Milanovic 2012), or for global environmental burdens to stop growing (De Vogli 2013). This 
last applies especially to environmental burdens that involve global collective action 
problems, such as climate change, where the costs borne by GHG-emitting individuals, 
enterprises or even most nations bear virtually no relation to the level of emissions they 
generate. Expectations were raised in advance of the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009, 
and its failure to make significant progress created widespread disillusion with international 
summitry. There were lower expectations of subsequent Conference of Parties (COPs), and 
of the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development; until the recent Paris 
COP, these expectations were not exceeded (Goldin 2013). 
Considering the history of attempts to create the institutions of global governance, these 
difficulties are not surprising (Mazower 2012). Most efforts to strengthen global governance 
are resisted – for good reasons and bad – even when there is widespread agreement that 
the stated goals are laudable. In relation to inequalities and environmental burdens, there are 
widely divergent views on what should be considered egregious or excessive, and whether 
and how they should be controlled. There are vested interests wanting to maintain privileged 
positions. There are also legitimate concerns that regulatory or governmental powers will be 
misappropriated and corrupted in the international arena, particularly if the organisations of 
governance have been hastily constructed, and are not rooted in healthy or supportive 
national and local institutions. Alternatively, in a variety of Catch 22 – given the limited 
powers likely to be granted to any global agency attempting to address global inequalities or 
environmental burdens – there is also legitimate scepticism about the potential influence of 
such agencies and related agreements. Even the limited governance structures of the United 
Nations have been heavily contested and face serious difficulties, not least because of 
national politics (Goldin 2013; Goldin and Reinert 2012). 
Cities and urbanisation might seem to be irrelevant or even undermining of global attempts to 
address sustainability issues. Technologically and economically, cities and urbanisation are 
usually associated with increasing efficiencies that create the capacity to produce more with 
less, but are more often used to produce much more with more – in a variant of the Jevons 
paradox (Freire-González and Puig-Ventosa 2014; Madlener and Alcott 2009; Polimeni et al. 
2008). Greater efficiencies are accompanied by technological and economic developments 
that bring new uses and new demands to the market, increasing aggregate resource 
consumption and waste. Politically, the growing importance of cities, often at the expense of 
the nation state, would seem to be shifting power away from the global scale where there is 
the most critical need for stronger governance mechanisms. 
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However, the shift of powers to cities, and the declining hegemony of the nation state, could 
also provide more scope for global governance. As expressed by Elinor Ostrom in relation to 
climate change: ‘Building a global regime is a necessity, but encouraging the emergence of a 
polycentric system starts the process of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and acts as a 
spur to international regimes to do their part’ (Ostrom 2012: 353). More generally, a global 
regime is more likely to be successful if it is rooted in, and made more accountable by, active 
localities pursuing complementary goals. 
Cities are natural hubs in such a polycentric system, as they are important sub-national sites 
of state power; they are also key locations where state power, market-driven systems and 
alternative forms of self-organisation come together. Even in primarily agrarian societies, 
cities are where most new alliances are forged, civil society typically makes its presence felt 
and many social movements make their stands. Cities help to shape the lives of their 
residents, and many cities create their own distinctive ethos (Bell and De-Shalit 2011). Cities 
are where most market transactions are negotiated, but also where non-market interactions 
and shifting solidarities are particularly intense, and where planners are always necessary, if 
not necessarily liked. Individuals, enterprises and other organisations are attracted to or 
repelled from cities based on what they can buy and sell, but also on what they can secure 
outside of the market, from the state and directly from each other. Cities are where most 
private returns to agglomeration are to be found, where most public infrastructure 
investments are made, and where most large social events are organised. They exhibit the 
best and worst forms of social and political collaboration and, often, conflict (Davis and 
Libertun de Duren 2011). 
Whether urbanisation and cities enhance or undermine the sustainability transition that is 
needed, they clearly have an important role to play – particularly in countries where 
urbanisation and population growth are combining to create towns and cities that are growing 
extremely rapidly. But from a sustainability perspective, all of the world’s urban settlements 
have an important contribution to make; the difficulty is how to make it worth their while, from 
below and from above. 
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6 Can urbanisation and cities facilitate the 
combined pursuit of greater equality, 
security and sustainability? 
Urbanisation and cities have a reputation for sacrificing equality, security and sustainability 
for economic ends. Economy-minded defenders may point out that the pursuit of non-
economic goals benefits from a flourishing economy. However, their pursuit can easily come 
into conflict with economic goals and politics, and also with each other. As outlined above, 
cities are often viewed as engines of economic growth, and the politics of city growth 
coalitions can make it difficult to address inequalities, problems of exclusion and insecurity, 
and unsustainable practices. These difficulties are compounded when a city’s population is 
growing more rapidly than the authorities and local elites would like, and especially when 
they respond with exclusionary measures. 
In rapidly growing low-income cities, migrants and those living in informal settlements and 
working in the informal economy are often blamed for the city’s visible poverty and 
environmental degradation, and also for rising violence. Urban authorities can seem to face 
what have been termed ‘wicked’ policy problems – characterised by being complex, 
unpredictable, open-ended and essentially intractable (for a recent treatment of ‘wicked’ 
problems and public policy see Head and Alford (2015)). Efforts to improve conditions in 
overcrowded informal settlements and workplaces are seen to risk attracting more low-
income migrants to the city, exacerbating underlying problems and creating even more 
overcrowding and congestion. On the other hand, not providing informal settlements with 
services, or actively trying to limit informal settlement by threatening eviction, exacerbates 
the symptoms being ascribed to overcrowding. The result is often an awkward compromise, 
whereby people who cannot secure formal employment and afford to live in formal 
settlements are formally excluded (in the sense that if all regulations were enforced fully they 
would not be able to afford to live in the city), but informally accepted on disadvantageous 
terms. This is no solution, particularly for the disadvantaged, but also for the wealthier 
segments of the population. 
Somewhat similarly, the challenge of reconciling economic and environmental goals is also 
often presented as if it were a ‘wicked’ problem. Ecologists are best known for emphasising 
the importance of tipping points and the dangers of going past them, in local socio-ecological 
systems and at the planetary scale (Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015; Walker and 
Salt 2006, 2012). Policymakers are often more fearful of undermining national or city 
economic growth trajectories, and pushing the economy over a tipping point and into a 
recession. The notion that cities need to compete economically to succeed reinforces such 
fears, and the city economic growth coalitions described in Section 2.2 have every incentive 
to exaggerate the risks of redistribution or environmental measures. 
The separate pursuit of these goals can amplify the trade-offs. As described earlier, the 
politics of cities as growth machines leaves little room for efforts to retain a flourishing 
economy while negotiating efficient measures to prevent unsustainable practices or to 
reduce inequalities and insecurities. Narrowly environmental and social agendas also leave 
little room for seeking out ways of reducing trade-offs, even if both are inclined to claim that 
they support the other. The goal of achieving a secure and inclusive society is at least 
superficially more complementary to the other goals, but security and inclusion can 
themselves be at odds with one another, with government efforts to impose security only 
rarely inclusive. One of the problems with the 2030 agenda, with its multiplicity of Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and targets, is that the indivisibility of its different goals is 
strongly asserted but weakly supported (McGranahan et al. 2016). Somewhat the same 
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applies to literature on economic growth in cities that is green (see, for example, OECD 
2013) or equitable (see Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015). In these cases the tendency is to 
focus on certain aspects of economic growth (such as employment in the case of equitable 
growth) rather than on the broader political conflicts between the growth agenda and the 
green and equity agendas. 
The remainder of this final section focuses on four cross-cutting means through which the 
different goals can be pursued together more easily, without undermining economic 
productivity. The first is inclusive urbanisation, which, as already described, is relevant to 
each of the goals and can also be economically advantageous. The second is strategic 
decentralisation, involving the sort of localisation that can bring government ‘closer to [and 
more accountable to] the people’, while recognising the importance of multi-scale 
governance to ensure, for example, that cities are not expected to address individually issues 
that pose collective action problems at higher scales, such as rural–urban migration or 
mitigating global environmental change. In the absence of appropriate scaling of governance, 
cities will be tempted to be more exclusionary and contribute less to global sustainability than 
they ought to. The third means is engaging constructively with informality: accepting 
informality uncritically and crude efforts at formalisation both tend to undermine these goals, 
partly by increasing the trade-offs among them. Finally, there is treating wellbeing as an end 
and economic output as a means; a flourishing economy is central to all of the goals, but 
treating economic growth as an end in itself reinforces the more environmentally and socially 
damaging forms of urban growth politics. 
6.1 Inclusive urbanisation and cities 
A common theme running through much of this report is that especially when countries’ 
populations are growing rapidly, and urban populations are growing even more rapidly, cities 
are inclined to respond by excluding (sometimes more actively, sometimes less) the ‘excess’ 
population. It is not clear that such exclusion has much impact on urbanisation rates, but it 
does have an impact on wellbeing, not only of migrants but of disadvantaged urban groups 
generally. In effect, it can mean that the worst-off groups in a city are not so much being 
planned for as planned against. For example, zoning and other regulations prohibit them 
from living or working where they can afford to, and where they can earn a livelihood, so they 
end up living and working informally. Little effort is made to open up transport systems to 
new areas, or to provide low-income dwellers with ways of moving incrementally to liveable 
density. There are many forms and degrees of informality, but informality often opens people 
up to harassment and discrimination – though the strict enforcements of regulations can be 
even more oppressive. The result of ‘informality gone wrong’ is more problems that are then 
misleadingly blamed on overly rapid migration and population growth – expanding informal 
settlements, service deprivation in these settlements, conflict and insecurity. 
More inclusive urbanisation means planning for low-income urban populations and their 
growth, but also planning with them. Better-organised informal communities and informal 
workers sometimes appear as an obstacle to addressing the problems of informality, but they 
can become (and already are in some cities) an important part of the solution (Satterthwaite 
and Mitlin 2014). 
More inclusive urbanisation is likely to reduce national and, in some cases, urban 
inequalities, though urban inequalities may also rise if, as many cities fear, many more low-
income migrants are attracted in to urban settlements. There will be some trade-offs between 
opening up more land for low-income settlement and protecting environmentally sensitive 
land from inappropriate settlement. On the other hand, part of what drives people to 
environmentally sensitive land is the lack of better alternatives. More inclusive and engaged 
urbanisation should in principle be able to protect key sites while opening up land that is 
more suitable to settlements in more accessible and affordable sites. It should also reduce 
the trade-offs between more vigorous efforts to accelerate the transition to sustainability and 
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local wellbeing. Well-executed, inclusive urbanisation should also improve security in the 
poorest neighbourhoods. 
More inclusive urbanisation is not consistent with the images promoted of eco-cities, world 
cities or more generally the images of the future city projected by most city boosters and 
planners. It is certainly not consistent with the sort of planning criticised by Vanessa Watson 
as creating ‘fantasy cities’ and ‘smart city’ rhetoric (Watson 2013, 2015). Those who design 
or advocate such (imagined) cities eliminate poverty from the images, but have no plans for 
those who cannot afford to live in such cities, except implicit exclusion. 
There is, however, no reason to think that inclusive urbanisation requires sacrificing 
economic growth or, more importantly, the increased productivity that enables economic 
growth. As noted at the start of this report, urban economics generally treats demographic 
urbanisation as economically beneficial, and better connections within the city as conducive 
to this (Spence et al. 2009; World Bank 2009). Some of the better-known economists have 
expressed concerns about urban exclusion. In his assessment of the role of cities in 
economic growth, Duranton (2009) argues that cities can be expected to want to reduce 
rural–urban migration to the point that it harms the national economy, and that city authorities 
should not be given the opportunity to put this desire into practice. In his review of cities and 
development, Henderson (2010: 517) notes disapprovingly that ‘slums’ ‘may be in part 
intentional, driven by local policies which intend to restrain in-migration through offering very 
poor living conditions for migrants’. 
6.2 Strategic decentralisation 
For some time, decentralisation has been advocated by neoliberals disillusioned with the role 
of central governments, by neo-communitarians hoping that decentralisation will encourage 
grass-roots democracy, and by more narrowly pragmatic supporters of local governments 
claiming they are in the best position to meet the large number of local public needs (see 
Bardhan 2002). As already indicated in Section 2.2, outcomes have been mixed. 
Decentralisation has often devolved responsibilities but not given local authorities the basis 
for meeting them or made them accountable to their public. In any case, it is difficult to make 
a clear distinction between which responsibilities should be local, which regional, which 
national and which multinational; the concept of decentralisation implicitly devalues the 
importance of developing good relations between different levels of government so that they 
can combine to support both local initiative and larger-scale collective action challenges. 
As described in Section 5 on sustainability, climate change poses a global collective action 
problem, but cities can play an important role, both in implementing climate-related action 
(including efforts to reduce GHG emissions) and in joining with other cities to ensure that 
national policies and international agreements support appropriate local actions. 
Decentralisation needs to be developed strategically to bring the collective environmental 
interests at different scales into better alignment. Strategic decentralisation can also support 
the goals around inequality, insecurity and inclusion, but in order to do so, local governments 
need to have the incentive to engage constructively with all of their residents, and to 
welcome migrants. It undermines these goals when mechanistic decentralisation leads to 
cities competing to attract formal investments, making life even more difficult for those forced 
to work in the informal economy and to live in informal settlements. 
A reasonably high degree of urban autonomy is important not only because quasi-
autonomous local governments can respond better to the needs of their citizens, but also 
because it allows cities to become sites of innovation and experimentation that if successful 
can be spread to other cities or to the national level. City-level innovation and 
experimentation often focuses on economic growth, particularly when that is also the national 
government’s priority. For example, when post-Maoist China shifted towards a more market-
driven economy, most of the experimentation was undertaken in emerging or pre-existing 
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cities (designated as special economic zones) where capital and labour came together under 
the auspices of bureaucratic entrepreneurs to become enormously successful motors of 
economic growth (McGee et al. 2007; Naughton 2007). 
There are also cases where experimentation and innovation has been more focused on the 
other goals. For example, after the fall of the rightist dictatorship in Brazil, when the Workers’ 
Party first gained power democratically in cities, it experimented with new approaches to 
participation and social redistribution (Baiocchi 2003). City-level successes became the basis 
for national initiatives a decade or so later, and its urban roots were evident when the 
national government passed exceptionally inclusive urban legislation in the form of a ‘City 
Statute’ (Fernandes 2007; Santos Carvalho and Rossbach 2010). There are numerous 
examples where cities have become internationally known for their innovations, such as 
Curitiba for its environmental initiatives (Rabinovitch 1992) and Medellín for its efforts to 
reduce violence through inclusion (Cerdá et al. 2012; Moncada 2016, especially chapter 3). 
Such innovation requires decentralisation, but decentralisation alone does not ensure that 
the right innovations succeed. 
6.3 Engaging constructively with urban informality 
Since urban informality first attracted serious attention in the early 1970s (Hart 1973), many 
have treated it as a temporary phenomenon soon to be driven out by the formal economy 
and formal settlements. Instead, both the informal economy and informal settlements have 
grown, and now account for the majority of urban employment and housing in large parts of 
the world (Satterthwaite and Mitlin 2014; Vanek et al. 2014). Such informality is still often 
treated as temporary, however, in part because in some circles it cannot be formally 
accepted. 
Urban informality is relevant to all of the goals of concern in this report, and to economic 
productivity and growth, but in each case the relationship is ambiguous. The informal 
economy is, on average, less productive than the formal economy (Porta and Shleifer 2014), 
but repressing the informal economy is likely to reduce productivity still further. The urban 
informal economy and informal settlements are symptoms of inequality, and their informality 
reflects a form of exclusion, but enforcing the regulations that created this informality is likely 
to exacerbate the underlying inequalities. Violence often arises in informal settlements, but 
the failure of governments to be more accepting of informal settlements and economies is 
often part of the problem. Ignoring the informal economy while trying to accelerate the 
transition to sustainability not only risks increasing inequalities but also risks driving 
environmentally degrading activities into the informal sector, while failing to support the 
informal activities that are or can become environmentally beneficial. Alternatively, adopting 
a conventional regulatory approach to ‘greening’ the informal sector could easily increase 
inequalities and insecurity, without much environmental benefit (for a discussion of the 
greening of the informal sector, see Brown and McGranahan 2016). 
From the perspective of pursuing all of these goals, better relations between local authorities 
and those living and working in informality are central. Informal workers and residents may 
be able to use rights-based approaches to defend their interests and, in some cases, to 
challenge the regulatory systems that undermine their human rights. However, this is 
complicated by the legally awkward position that informal workers and residents are often in 
– one that in many cases discourages them from relying on legal approaches. Much can be 
learned from the experiences of what could be described as the more formal international 
organisations of informal residents and informal workers, such as Slum/Shack Dwellers 
International (SDI) and Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing 
(WIEGO), which are reasonably well-documented. There is also a lot to learn from the 
multitude of smaller and less well-connected organisations of informal residents and workers, 
only a few of which are well-documented. What seems likely, however, is that the goals 
would all be served by local governments being more supportive of those who depend on 
33 
informal settlements and economies, and more willing to engage with their organisations. 
Better relations may lead to an implicit or explicit formalisation of most informal settlements 
and enterprises, but that should not be the goal. 
6.4 Treating wellbeing as an end and economic output as a 
means 
Whatever is done in terms of urban inclusion, decentralisation and informality, there will 
always be trade-offs as well as synergies between achieving economic growth, reducing 
inequality, achieving secure and inclusive societies, and accelerating the transition to 
sustainability. The most powerful groups in many existing cities prioritise economic growth, 
and to the extent that they value the other goals, they would want to assess the trade-offs in 
economic terms, using actual or surrogate market values. Many would argue, however, that 
wellbeing is the more obvious goal, and increasing wellbeing is much less at odds with the 
other goals than is economic growth, though the defence of economic growth as a goal is 
typically that it contributes to human wellbeing. 
In terms of inequalities, societies have historically tried to resist the tendency for economies 
dominated by markets to create large income differentials, as these have been deemed 
unacceptable by large parts of the population (Polanyi 2001). Much criticism has focused on 
the income differences being unfair. Recent research on subjective wellbeing raises a 
different doubt regarding the large income differentials that markets often generate: after a 
point, the wealthy themselves are not actually better off. As summarised by Kahneman 
(2011: 396), ‘being poor makes one miserable’ while after a point ‘being rich may enhance 
one’s life satisfaction, but does not (on average) improve experienced well-being’. Moreover, 
at least some of the increased life satisfaction that comes with wealth derives from relative 
rather than absolute wealth. 
Wellbeing is also very consistent with the pursuit of a secure and inclusive society. After all, 
as with inequality, insecurity and exclusion undermine wellbeing (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2009). Similarly, understanding the sources and dynamics of insecurity and exclusion, and 
especially what Luckham (2015) refers to as security ‘in the vernacular’, can inform 
understandings of wellbeing – and avoid its collapse into little more than a more intellectually 
rigorous version of happiness. 
There is a potentially significant trade-off between present wellbeing and environmental 
sustainability; to some degree, it can be seen as a trade-off between present and future 
wellbeing. Indeed, a society that valued the wellbeing of future generations as highly as the 
wellbeing of the present generation would provide a strong basis for a rapid transition to 
sustainability – provided that the political means could be found for translating that value into 
practice. 
Inclusive urbanisation, strategic decentralisation, constructive engagement with informality 
and the pursuit of wellbeing: these are not inspiring concepts, and they are not part of any 
city’s vernacular. And who does not wish more for either a world city, an eco-city or a rebel 
city? (see Bassens and van Meeteren 2015; de Jong et al. 2015; Harvey 2012 for accounts 
of world cities, eco-cities and rebel cities respectively). But as the saying goes, people should 
be careful what they wish for. This report has argued that urbanisation and cities can 
contribute simultaneously to the development goals of reducing inequality, building more 
secure and inclusive societies, and accelerating the transition to sustainability. This is an 
enormous challenge, and can be expressed in inspiring terms, but not in this report. 
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